investment based on the Issuer’s business prospects and strategy.” Diana’s disclosure went on to say that Diana may “communicate with the board of directors of [Genco] (the “Board”), members of management and/or other shareholders or other relevant parties from time to time with respect to operational, strategic, financial or governance matters or otherwise work with management and the Board with a view to maximizing shareholder value.” The disclosure did not otherwise state anything specific about plans or proposals.
On July 31, 2025, Diana filed a Schedule 13D amendment in which it reported total beneficial ownership of 9.99% of the outstanding Genco shares, or 4,291,292 shares. It further disclosed that Diana had spent an aggregate of $61.7 million to acquire Genco shares from April 23, 2025 through July 31, 2025.
On September 30, 2025, Diana filed a Schedule 13D amendment reporting that it beneficially owned 6,413,151 shares, or 14.8% of Genco’s outstanding stock. In Exhibit B to the Schedule 13D amendment, Diana stated that it acquired 2,121,859 shares on September 29, 2025 for a weighted-average purchase price of $19.64 per share, “in the market through brokers.” However, publicly reported market data indicated that the reported trading volume for September 29, 2025 was 579,900 shares of Genco’s common stock of Genco and that the highest reported trading price of the common stock on such date was $18.18 as reported by FactSet.
On that same date, Genco’s Board met to discuss Diana’s Schedule 13D amendment. In light of Diana’s rapid accumulation of Genco shares, Diana’s perceived lack of or problematic disclosure of its purchases of Genco shares as noted above, Diana’s status as a competitor of Genco, Diana’s track record of requesting off-market terms for a business combination in 2024, fundamental strategic differences with Diana including fleet composition and Diana’s high leverage, and, our belief that Diana’s governance is of a much lower standard than the Company’s, including due to Diana’s use of related party transactions and limited corporate reporting, the Board considered that the prompt adoption of a shareholder rights agreement would be appropriate. Such an agreement would be similar to those adopted by other public companies and would be intended to enable all Genco shareholders to realize the long-term value of their investment. The agreement would be designed to reduce the likelihood that any entity, person, or group would gain control of or significant influence over the Company through open-market accumulation or other tactics potentially disadvantaging the interests of all shareholders, without paying all shareholders an appropriate control premium. The Board noted that the shareholder rights agreement would provide the Board with sufficient time to fulfill its fiduciary duties on behalf of all shareholders, and would not prevent the Board from considering any proposal. The proposed agreement would have a term through September 30, 2026.
On October 1, 2025, on the authorization of the Board, Genco entered into a shareholder rights agreement, which reflected a triggering threshold of beneficial ownership of 15% of Genco’s outstanding stock.
Diana Submits Inadequate and Unsolicited Takeover Proposals, Significantly Undervaluing Genco
On October 21, 2025, representatives of DNB Carnegie, Diana’s financial advisor, conveyed a proposal to Genco on behalf of Diana for a business combination. Representatives of DNB Carnegie conveyed Diana’s belief that “Genco is an excellent business with a strong management team, scalable platform and an attractive fleet.” Under the proposal, Diana would contribute its Newcastlemax and Capesize fleet to Genco in exchange for Genco common stock on a relative net asset value basis. As such, the proposal was substantially the same as the one made by Diana in 2024 and rejected by Genco after approximately five months of discussions. Specifically, the proposal called for 30% ownership by Diana in a combined corporation without distribution of the corporation’s shares to Diana’s shareholders; three of nine directors allocated to Diana; designation of Ms. Paliou as Chair of the board of the combined company; and technical management of the combined corporation’s fleet by Diana. At a meeting on November 4, 2025, Genco’s Board considered that it would be more reasonable for Genco, as the larger of the two companies with superior financial performance, to acquire Diana. Noting that Diana’s latest proposal could impair value for Genco’s existing shareholders in the same way that Diana’s 2024 proposal would have, the Board viewed the latest proposal as not in the best interests of Genco’s shareholders, and Genco conveyed its rejection of the proposal to DNB Carnegie.
Following this, the Board considered the need for further action to protect other shareholders from being disadvantaged, given Diana’s persistence in proposing transactions that would give it control of Genco without paying an appropriate control premium to Genco’s shareholders. The Board took note of Diana’s rapid accumulation of Genco’s stock and the possibility that Diana could transfer its position in Genco in whole or in part to another entity. Noting that the Company had a significant retail shareholder base and low voter turnout, the Board observed the outsized impact a transferred or additional block of shares could have on shareholder voting, thereby disadvantaging minority shareholders. The Board considered the advisability of amending Genco’s shareholder